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Only the Good Regulations Die Young:
Recognizing the Consumer Benefits of the FCC’s
Now-Defunct Privacy Regulations
Paul R. Gaus*
[Editor’s Note: This Note was well into the publication
process when the United States Congress passed Senate Joint
Resolution 34, signed into law on April 3, 2017.1 The resolution
repealed the Federal Communication Commission’s rule
relating to “Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband
and Other Telecommunications Services,” on which the author’s
argument principally focused. Nevertheless, the Note’s analysis
regarding the FCC’s role in data privacy regulation still stands
as it applies to any similar framework proposed in the future.]
A recent study by the Pew Research Center2 demonstrates
American consumers’ concern about the use and storage of their
personally identifiable information online. Surveys estimate
that 86% of Americans take some steps to minimize their digital
footprints.3 Whereas Americans once trusted online providers to
protect data,4 consumers currently express little confidence in
© 2017 Paul R. Gaus
* BA Marquette University, 2012; JD Candidate 2017, University of
Minnesota Law School. Thank you to Mr. Charles Ragan for his feedback and
critique of this Note and for being a friend. Thank you to many San Franciscans
for their guidance and friendship throughout my life including, Kathy Grogan,
Steve Piuma, Joe Strizich, Daniel Hackett, Officer Christopher Viehweg, and
Dr. Edward Powers, M.D. Finally, thank you to my mom, Therese Gaus, and
my late father, William A. Gaus, for the sacrifices they made in their life to give
me the opportunities I have today.
1. S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); 163 Cong. Rec. H2749-01
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 2017).
2. The Pew Research Center describes itself as a “non-partisan fact tank”
that focuses primarily on United States policy. See About Pew Research Center,
PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
3. Lee Raine, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/thestate-of-privacy-in-america/.
4. See, e.g., Joseph Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: America’s Shoppers
Online and Offline 3 (June 1, 2005) (unnumbered working paper),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_pap
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organizations, both public and private, to properly handle their
personally identifiable information.5 Consequently, 91% of
digital consumers worry that they have lost control over their
personal data, and seek greater autonomy over information
collected, stored, and disseminated about them.6 As noted
frequently in scholarly literature, no overarching federal
regulation or law controls these practices.7 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) champions itself as the guardian of consumer
data privacy,8 but critics contend the FTC is understaffed at best
and feckless at worst.9 In theory, consumers could litigate their
own privacy interests, but Courts are often unreceptive to
individual data privacy claims absent a worst case scenario data
breach.10 Recently, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) significantly altered the internet regulatory landscape
with its Open Internet Order.11 Although data privacy did not
ers (noting that 75% of Americans believed that websites which had privacy
policies would not “share [the user’s] information with other websites and
companies”).
5. Raine, supra note 3 (explaining that Americans exhibited a “deep lack
of faith in organizations of all kinds, public or private, in protecting the personal
information they collect”).
6. See id.
7. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Herzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (describing
privacy law as a “hodgepodge of various constitutional protections, federal and
state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and treaties”). See generally William
McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959 (2016)
(describing the American approach to privacy regulation as targeting specific
industries, technologies, or types of information).
8. See Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (“The FTC has been the chief federal agency on
privacy policy and enforcement since the 1970s . . . .”).
9. Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive,
Toothless, WIRED (June 28, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftcfail/ (contending a lack of resources and explicit legal authority hamper the
FTC’s ability to execute its mission); see Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy
in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 359 (2015)
(arguing the FTC’s enforcement powers are inadequate to accomplish elements
of Fair Information Practice Principles).
10. See generally John Biglow, Note, It Stands to Reason: An Argument for
Article III Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data Breach
Litigation, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 943 (2016) (discussing how the Supreme
Court’s “case or controversy” requirement is a frequent roadblock for litigants
in privacy cases).
11. See generally Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket
No. 14-28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order
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drive the Order, the FCC ventured further, recently adopting
rules related to data privacy for internet service providers
(ISPs).12
This Note argues that the FCC’s recent rulemaking provides
a promising framework to spur much-needed change regarding
data privacy practices. The rules are not a panacea. They target
only a subset of the vast internet ecosystem, but they favor
consumers. They are especially desirable when considering the
FTC’s limitations in this area and the judiciary’s reluctance to
hear consumer data cases even in the face of clear statutory
violations. Section I.A of this Note provides a brief explanation
of the key entities in the internet ecosystem. Section I.B defines
consumer privacy. It explores theoretical concepts and policy
proposals urging for greater transparency and choice for
consumers relating to their personally identifiable information.
Section I.C discusses the FTC’s authority to police privacy
interests. Section I.D then outlines the FCC’s traditional
jurisdiction, the recent Open Internet Order, and the subsequent
FCC rulemaking. It then describes consumers’ fluctuating
access to Courts to litigate their own privacy interests, including
the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Spokeo v. Robins.13 Part
II of this Note argues the FCC’s recent rulemaking is the most
effective federal mechanism thus far for protecting consumer
privacy interests. It begins by outlining the limitations on the
FTC’s ability to enforce consumer privacy interests. Part II then
argues that the judiciary’s commitment to Article III standing
impedes consumers’ ability to litigate their own privacy
interests. Considering these significant obstacles, this Note
analyzes how the FCC’s regime provides advantages to
consumers in ways the FTC and the Courts cannot, or will not,
do.

Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (Mar. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Open Internet Order].
12. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband & Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Docket No. 16-106, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd. 2500 (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Proposed
Rulemaking].
13. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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BACKGROUND

A. BRIEF PRIMER ON THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM AND DATA
MANAGEMENT
The internet ecosystem describes “organizations and
communities that have organically evolved to guide the
operation and development of the technologies and
infrastructure that comprise the global Internet.”14 The
organizations are numerous and most are beyond the scope of
this Note.15 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines the
internet as “the combination of computer facilities and
electromagnetic transmission media, and related equipment and
software, comprising the interconnected worldwide network of
computer networks.”16 This Note focuses on three players in the
internet ecosystem: (1) internet service providers (ISPs); (2) edge
providers, and (3) consumers.17
ISPs provide access to the internet through physical cables
or digital subscriber lines (DSL).18 In most instances, ISPs also
provide the customer with telephone and cable services –
Comcast’s “triple play” package is an example.19 The industry is
concentrated – the five largest ISPs accounted for nearly 75% of
market share in the United States in 2016.20 ISPs possess two
types of consumer data: (1) web traffic detailing an individual’s

14. INTERNET SOC’Y, INTERNET ECOSYSTEM: NAMING AND ADDRESSING,
SHARED GLOBAL SERVICES AND OPERATIONS, AND OPEN STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT 5 (2014), https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp
_Internet%20Ecosystem_032614_en.pdf.
15. See generally id. The Open Internet Society defines broadly the five
categories of the actors in the internet ecosystem. Id. Within each category,
there are numerous sub-groups. Id.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3) (2012).
17. See Simone A. Friedlander, Net Neutrality and the FCC’s 2015 Open
Internet Order, 3 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 905, 908 (2016).
18. Internet Terms: ISP Definition, TECHTERMS (May 29, 2016),
http://techterms.com/definition/isp.
19. A “triple play” package gives the customer cable television services,
telephone, and internet for one account. See, e.g., Xfinity Triple Play, COMCAST,
http://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Learn/Bundles/bundles.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017); see also KC Claffy & David Clark, Platform Models for
Sustainable Internet Regulation, 4 J. INFO. POL’Y 463 (2014).
20. See MADELINE LECLAIR, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 51711D:
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE US 28 (Oct. 2016), http://clients1
.ibisworld.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/reports/us/industry/competitivelandscape.asp
x?entid=1901#MSC.
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internet consumption, and (2) personally identifiable
information regarding physical location corresponding to the
account for internet services.21 Technologies such as encryption
and the proliferation of mobile devices fracture ISPs’ access to
this data.22 However, the ability to create a “device map” for any
particular consumer remains.23
By contrast, edge providers, like Netflix, Google, and
Facebook, furnish content on the internet.24 Edge providers
depend on ISPs for functionality.25 The type and scope of data
edge providers access largely hinges on the service provided. For
example, Google knows search queries tied to a certain device.26
Similarly, most websites require consumers to provide certain
types of information in order to accomplish the website’s
purpose.27 In such cases, users willingly provide information

21. Because ISPs provide the gatekeeping function from the internet to the
consumer, they “carry users’ data traffic on their network. In most cases, ISPs
have relatively accurate information about a subscriber’s name and billing
address, and may have their credit card information and phone number.” Peter
Swire et al., Online Privacy and ISPs: ISP Access to Consumer Data is Limited
and Less than Access by Others 23 (2016) (Inst. for Info. Sec. & Privacy at Ga.
Tech. Working Paper), http://www.iisp.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/images
/online_privacy_and_isps.pdf. But see id. at 6–7 (discussing the “mistaken view”
that ISPs possess more personally identifiable information online).
22. Id. at 24–25.
23. Id. at 116–18.
24. See Friedlander, supra note 17, at 908; see also Hon. Maureen K.
Ohlhausen, The FCC’s Knowledge Problem: How to Protect Consumers Online,
67 FED. COMM. L.J. 203, 232 (2015) (listing Google, Facebook, Amazon, Youtube,
LinkedIn, and Pandora as typical edge providers).
25. One of the issues surrounding the net neutrality debate centers on ISPs’
ability to prevent consumers from reaching edge providers through practices
like “throttling.” See Ohlhausen, supra note 24, at 224; see also Definition of:
Edge Network, PC MAG., http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/42363/edgenetwork (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
26. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy:
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 445
(2014).
27. See, e.g., HAROLD FELD ET AL., PROTECTING PRIVACY PROMOTING
COMPETITION: A FRAMEWORK FOR UPDATING THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION PRIVACY RULES FOR THE DIGITAL WORLD 45 (2016), https://www
(“Edge
.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/article-cpni-whitepaper.pdf
providers generally have only one or the other of [users’ internet access habits
or physical location], and importantly consumers always have the ability to opt
out . . . .”); see also Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1441 (2009) (“Google cannot know what users buy on
Amazon or eBay, what they read on the New York Times, or who they friend on
Facebook.”).
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such as birth date, hometown, and in some cases, financial
information.28
Defining the internet consumer seems like a facile task, but
it must incorporate how the person uses digital devices to
connect to the internet and use content.29 In the context of ISPs,
the digital consumer conforms to a traditional definition in that
the consumer purchases ISP services to access the internet.30 In
the space of edge providers, the digital consumer engages in
traditional retail, watches content, interacts with others via
social media, and performs a plethora of other activities that
provide a telling summary about a person’s life.31
B. DEFINING CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THEIR
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION AND THE POSSIBLE
HARM
A large-scale discussion of theoretical privacy concepts is
unnecessary for this Note beyond the contention that privacy is
a fluid concept that consumers value.32 Surveys, news articles,
and other studies demonstrate how digital proliferation shifted
consumers’ privacy expectations.33 For example, a telephone
28. See FELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 55–56.
29. See The U.S. Digital Consumer Report, NIELSEN (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2014/the-us-digital-consumerreport.html.
30. Definition of Consumer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (last visited Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consumer (defining a consumer
as “one that consumes such as one that utilizes economic goods”).
31. See NIELSEN, supra note 29.
32. For the most cited theory of privacy, see Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel
D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), where Justice
Brandeis posits
[t]hat the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature
and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its
eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.
Id. at 193.
33. See, e.g., What’s a Consumer to Do? Consumer Perceptions and
Expectations of Privacy Online: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011)
(testimony of Pam Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/PamDixon
ConsumerExpectationTestimonyfsshort.pdf (listing, in 2011, several consumer
misconceptions about privacy). In the testimony, Dixon details complaints she
received from consumers. Id. For example, she mentions consumer concerns
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survey conducted in 2005 revealed that 75% of Americans
believed that online privacy policies signaled a commitment
from entities to safeguard information.34 Subsequent news and
information revealed the extent to which companies derived
value from doing the exact opposite. The emergence of big data—
whereby companies compiled and sold consumers’ fractured
online browsing habits—fostered digital advertising.35
Exploration of this industry disclosed certain unsavory practices
and subsequent consumer backlash.36 For example, these
processes allowed companies to make predictions about personal
preferences, based on a few data points, like child birth,
geographic location, and sensitive health information of
consumers.37
Technology’s ability to create consumer tapestries prompted
new theories about acceptable use, storage, and dissemination of
consumer data. Solove identifies several ways unregulated use
and dissemination of data harms consumers.38 For example,
information processing facilitates efficiency, but also creates

about Google Street View presenting pictures of people’s backyards and
frustration about not being able to exercise certain opt-out functions on
websites. Id.; see also Bob Sullivan, Privacy Under Attack, but Does Anybody
Care?, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2006, 4:14 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id
/15221095/ns/technology_and_science–privacy_lost/t/privacy–under–attack–
does–anybody–care/# (describing, in 2006, Americans’ “indifference” towards
online privacy matters).
34. See, e.g., Turow et al., supra note 4.
35. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Discrimination and
the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 345–46 (2014) (“Still it is clear
that a growing number of businesses are using big data to . . . determine
‘people’s life opportunities – to borrow money, work, travel, obtain housing, get
into college, and far more.’”) (quoting Danielle Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18
(2014)); see also DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 118–19 (2008)
(discussing how, through the process of data aggregation, technology produces
“digital dossiers” on people).
36. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoppinghabits.html; Kashmir Hill, Data Broker Was Selling Lists of Rape Victims,
Alcoholic, and “Erectile Dysfunction Sufferers, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/19/data-broker-was-sellinglists-of-rape-alcoholism-and-erectile-dysfunction-sufferers/.
37. See Duhigg, supra note 36; Hill, supra note 36 (discussing how one data
broker, MEDbase 2000, compiled lists pertaining to consumers’ medical history,
including “erectile dysfunction sufferers, alcoholism sufferers, and AIDS/HIV
sufferers”).
38. SOLOVE, supra note 35, at 101–70.
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anxiety about “risks of downstream harm that can emerge from
inadequate protection of compendiums of personal data.”39
Furthermore, unfettered secondary use of the data outside the
context of the original purpose for collection erodes trust
between the consumer and the online world.40
While lagging well behind many foreign states, the public
sector in the United States inched in recent years towards
defining consumer expectations about the collection, use and
dissemination of personally identifiable information. In 2012,
the Obama Administration provided a new framework in its
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.41 Among other items, the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights focused on individual control,
transparency, security, focused collection, and accountability.42
Individual control encouraged companies to provide consumers
appropriate control of their data at the time of collection.43
Transparency sought to bridge the knowledge gap between the
consumer and company through “meaningful understanding of
privacy risks and the ability to exercise Individual
Control . . . .”44 Focused collection challenged companies to
“engage in considered decisions about the kinds of data they
need to collect to accomplish specific purposes.”45 Finally,
security and accountability placed the onus on companies to
handle data in a responsible manner and conduct ongoing
reviews of data management.46
C. THE FTC’S CURRENT ROLE AS A PRIVACY WATCHDOG
An agency born out of the Woodrow Wilson administration
has seized responsibility for regulating the vast internet
ecosystem.47 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)48
39. Id. at 127.
40. See id. at 131.
41. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), reprinted in 4 J. PRIVACY
& CONFIDENTIALITY 95 (2012).
42. See id. at 103–04.
43. See id. at 105.
44. Id. at 108.
45. Id. at 115.
46. See id. at 113, 116.
47. Our History, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
/our-history (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
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tasked the FTC (the Agency) with protecting consumers and
promoting competition.49 FTC enforcement authority lies in
Section 5 of the FTC Act (Section 5) which directs the Agency to
regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”50 An unfair or
deceptive trade practice is one that “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”51 The
meaning of “unfair” remained shrouded in ambiguity until the
FTC put forth a test known as the “Cigarette Rule” that declared
a practice unfair if it “offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise . . . 2)
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 3)
whether is causes substantial injury to consumers.”52 The Rule
experienced a period of dormancy, but Congress later codified a
more precise version of the Cigarette Rule requiring the injury
to be (1) substantial, (2) not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers, and (3) not reasonably avoided.53
1. The FTC’s Notice-and-Choice Model
Now, the FTC enjoys the status as “the de facto federal data
protection authority.”54 Its first foray into the world of online
privacy occurred when the Agency presented a 1998 report to
Congress on “fair information practice codes.”55 The fair

49. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2013, at 135 (Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls, 2013).
52. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964). The Supreme Court tacitly accepted this test as a basis
for determining unfair practices in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233,
244 n.5 (1972). See also Amy Grewal Dunn, Bridging the Gap: How the Injury
Requirement in FTC Enforcement Actions and Article III Standing Are Merging
in the Data Breach Realm, 20 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 9, 10–11 (2016).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
54. Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 600; Protecting Consumer Privacy,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources
/protecting-consumer-privacy (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (“The FTC has been
the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement since the 1970s.”).
55. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7
(1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online
-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf.
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information practice codes encompassed five core principles
concerning
data
privacy:
(1)
notice/awareness;
(2)
choice/consent; (3) access/participation; (4) integrity/security;
and (5) enforcement/redress.56 Within the enforcement/redress
prong, the FTC promoted a mix of internal and external
mechanisms to regulate online privacy practices.57 First, the
Agency proposed self-regulation rooted in accepted standards
that establish remedies to correct errors and provide monetary
compensation to consumers where necessary.58 Second, the
Agency advocated “[a] statutory scheme [to] create private rights
of action for consumers harmed by an entity’s unfair information
practices.”59 Third, the FTC proposed a rigorous legislative
scheme bolstered by Agency investigation and enforcement
powers.60
Currently, the FTC practices a “notice and choice” model for
online consumer data practices.61 Scholars believe that the
notice-and-choice model reflects the FTC’s preference for
industry self-regulation enhanced with flexible consumer
options regarding data practices.62 Under this framework,
companies inform consumers about the use and storage of their
data—a privacy policy is one example—and provide consumers
with certain opt-out options.63 Commentators touted this as
56. Id.
57. Id. at 10–11.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id at 11, 62 n.160.
61. Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 592.
62. See id. at 598. Attempts at industry self-regulation have come in
various degrees and forms. For example, the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standards provides organizations that conduct business with member
card companies must set up a data security infrastructure with a vulnerability
management system that is subject to regular testing. See PCI SEC. STANDARDS
COUNCIL, DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 14 (2010), https://www
.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20
Guide.pdf. Additionally, the Digital Advertising Alliance comprises various
digital advertising organizations that established guidelines for consumer
privacy protections. About the Digital Advertising Alliance, DIGITAL ADVERT.
ALLIANCE, http://digitaladvertisingalliance.org/about (last visited Feb. 19,
2017).
63. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICY MAKERS i
(2012); see also Andrew Hasty, Treating Consumer Data Like Oil: How ReFraming Digital Interactions Might Bolster the Federal Trade Commission’s
New Privacy Framework, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 293, 296 (2015).
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creating a happy medium between onerous regulations that may
be unable to keep up with technological change and a completely
unregulated frontier.64
2. The FTC Moves to a Harm-Based Model
In a 2010 report, the FTC acknowledged the notice-andchoice model’s shortcomings.65 The FTC also proposed the
“harm-based model” which emphasized specific enforcement of
consumer privacy laws.66 The harm-based approach sanctions
poor data practices under the umbrella of the FTC’s traditional
definition of unfair or deceptive practices.67 Five FTC statutes
permit the FTC to take enforcement action for privacy
violations.68 Enforcement actions are procedure heavy: an
enforcement action begins with an investigation, the Agency
weighs whether further action is necessary, and submits a
proposed complaint.69 Following the complaint, the focus of the
FTC’s investigation may choose to litigate the complaint “in
64. Siona Listokin, Industry Self-Regulation of Consumer Data Privacy and
Security, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 15, 17 (2015) (examining
the effects of membership in voluntary consumer data privacy standards).
65. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
iii (2010) (“[T]he notice-and-choice model, as implemented, has led to long,
incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let
alone understand.”); see also Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice
and Choice: Privacy, Norm, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 390–91
(2014) (arguing that privacy policies, an essential component of notice-andchoice, cannot provide enough information to provide adequate notice).
66. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 65, at 9–10.
67. Vaibhav Garg & L. Jean Camp, Ex Ante v. Ex Post: Economically
Efficient Sanctioning Regimes for Online Risks 4 (Mar. 31, 2013) (41st Res.
Conf. on Comm. Info. & Internet Pol’y Working Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2242474 (discussing harm-based approach in the
context of environmental torts that take place after an environmental calamity).
68. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. §45(n) (2012);
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012); Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108
(2012); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506 (2012); Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012).
69. See Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 609; see also David C. Grossman,
Blaming the Victim: How FTC Data Security Enforcement Actions Make
Companies and Consumers More Vulnerable to Hackers, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1283, 1302 (stating the FTC will conduct an investigation about data practices
and it will conduct a multi-layered investigation) (“This [investigation] is not
limited to the initial data collection, but any use of data after it is collected that
is inconsistent with the context within which the company originally collected
it.”)
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front of an administrative or federal district court judge.”70
Triggers for FTC complaints generally range from allegations of
insufficient security measures, to negligent training and
security procedures, to failing to honor security and privacy
policies, to insufficient disclosure of data collection, and to
deceptive data collection practices.71
Critics of FTC enforcement actions contend that they are
arbitrary and fail to provide entities clear guidelines on the
Agency’s positions.72 These objections peaked when the FTC’s
authority to regulate data privacy was challenged in FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp.73 The FTC lodged a complaint
against Wyndham Hotels alleging that the company’s security
measures unreasonably exposed consumers’ personal data.74
Wyndham countered that the FTC did not have authority to
regulate cybersecurity as an unfair practice because the FTC has
never taken a clear position on the issue.75 The Third Circuit
upheld the FTC’s jurisdiction for several reasons. First, the
Third Circuit determined the “unfairness” prong of Section 5
permitted the FTC to regulate cyber-security practices.76
Second, even though Congress later passed specific statutes
permitting the Agency to regulate certain types of data practices,
it did not negate the FTC’s general regulatory authority over
cybersecurity practices.77
Despite the favorable results of Wyndham, the scope of the
FTC’s jurisdiction remains in purgatory. In 2013, the FTC filed
a complaint against LabMD, a Georgia medical corporation.78
70. Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 609.
71. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709, 742–43 (2002) (issuing an
order that Microsoft establish security and confidentiality measures for
personally identifiable information); Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763, 766–67
(2002) (alleging an employee negligently disclosed email addresses of
subscribers to a healthcare information service).
72. See, e.g., Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 607 (“Critics of the FTC have
complained that the FTC acts in an unpredictable fashion and that companies
lack guidance about what they ought to do.”).
73. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
74. Id. at 240.
75. Wyndham alleged that the FTC never indicated a clear agency position
about data practices being unfair under Section 5. Id. at 253.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id.
78. Complaint, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, F.T.C. File No. 1023099 (F.T.C.
Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08
/130829labmdpart3.pdf.
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The complaint stemmed from inadvertent exposure of client files
on a peer-to-peer network that was “likely to cause injury to
consumers.”79 An administrative judge dismissed the complaint,
but the FTC followed through with an order requiring LabMD to
“notify affected individuals, establish a comprehensive
information security program, and obtain assessments
regarding its implementation of the program.”80 LabMD
appealed directly to the Eleventh Circuit, which granted a stay
on the FTC’s order.81 The Circuit cast doubt on whether a
reasonable interpretation of the Agency’s enforcement powers
encompasses speculative injuries.82 Compounding this, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the FTC did not show a high
probability that consumers would be harmed.83
D. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: REGULATORY
POLICY, SCOPE, AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Congress established the Federal Communications
Commission “[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to
make available . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges.”84 Title II of the 1934
Communications Act applies to “common carriers” of
communications services, providing “[i]t shall be the duty of
every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication
service upon reasonable request.”85 Section 201(b) of the Federal
Communications Act states, “[a]ll charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with
[foreign and interstate communication service by wire or radio],
shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice,
classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is

79. Id. at *5.
80. Order, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, at *37 (F.T.C. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmd-opinion.pdf.
81. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 WL 8116800, at *1 (11th
Cir. Nov. 10, 2016).
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *5.
84. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
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declared to be unlawful.”86 Furthermore, Section 222 of the
Communications Act of 1996 places a duty of care on
telecommunications providers to “protect the confidentiality of
proprietary information of, and relating to, other
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and
customers.”87
Whereas consumer protection drives FTC policy, it is a
secondary consideration in telecommunications regulation.88
More often, telecommunications regulatory policy stems from
the premise that telecommunications are a public good that
should be regulated as a utility.89 Therefore, policy goals center
on “eliminat[ing] ‘wasteful’ competition, set[ting] reasonable
prices, and guarantee[ing] universal service.”90 However, the
FCC does oversee some consumer protection statutes like the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).91 Congress passed
the TCPA “to protect the privacy interests of residential
telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited,
automated telephone calls.”92 In response to consumer
sentiments about this deeply unpopular practice, the FCC, in
conjunction with the FTC, created the national do-not-call list.93
1. The FCC Brings ISPs within Its Regulatory Scope
The FCC created a titanic shift in the landscape for data
regulation in 2015 when the Commission published the Open

86. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a).
88. See, e.g., James B. Speta, Reconciling Breadth and Depth in Digital Age
Communications Policy, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL
AGE: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS 67 (Randolph J. May ed., 2012) (discussing
antitrust as the foremost consideration for communications policy); accord
MARC EISNER ET AL., CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 120 (2d ed. 2006)
(discussing the Congressional goal of creating a communications infrastructure
with universal service).
89. EISNER ET AL., supra note 88, at 123 (“Telephone service has always
been considered an essential public good; that is, providers, customers,
politicians, and regulators all believe in universal service as a primary policy
goal.”).
90. Id.
91. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
92. S. REP. NO. 102–178, at 1 (1991).
93. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller et al., The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology,
26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 355 (2014) (noting the volume of complaints
Congress received about telemarketing calls).
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Internet Order.94 In the lengthy Order, the Commission removed
broadband internet access service (BIAS) from the definition of
information services and reclassified it as a telecommunications
service subject to the Commission’s regulatory authority under
Title II.95 The Commission defined BIAS as “a mass-market
retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all
Internet endpoints.”96 The reclassification brought anyone
“engaged” in providing broadband internet access within the
scope of the Communications Act.97 In layman’s terms, this
meant ISPs, previously beyond the reach of the FCC, were now
subject to FCC jurisdiction.98
2. The FCC Proposes Privacy Rules Specifically for ISPs
Concerns about data privacy did not prompt the FCC’s
monumental Open Internet Order.99 However, in the short
period following the Order, the FCC (here, the Commission)

94. See generally Open Internet Order, supra note 11.
95. See id. ¶ 47. The Open Internet Order was a culmination of court
decisions giving the FCC the authority to regulate broadband internet access
service providers as telecommunications services. Id. ¶ 308. In National Cable
and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court
held the FCC’s definition of telecommunications service lawful under the
Chevron framework. 545 U.S. 967, 1002 (2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. numerous times in the opinion; see 467
U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Friedlander, supra note 17, at 918. Following the
Brand X decision, the D.C. Circuit identified an avenue for the FCC to regulate
broadband providers in Verizon v. FCC. See generally 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.
2014). In the opinion, the D.C. Circuit cited § 706(a) of the Telecommunications
Act which permitted the FCC regulation on broadband internet access service
providers if such entities were properly reclassified as telecommunications
providers. Verizon, 704 F.3d at 649–50.
96. See Open Internet Order, supra note 11, § 8.2, at 5884.
97. Id. ¶ 339.
98. See Kimberlee Morrison, Net Neutrality: FCC Reclassifies ISPs as
Common Carriers, ADWEEK (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.adweek.com/digital/net
-neutrality-fcc-reclassifies-isps-as-common-carriers/; Marguerite Reardon, FCC
and Net Neutrality: What You Really Need to Know, CNET (Feb. 7, 2015, 5:00
AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/fcc-and-net-neutrality-what-you-really-needto-know/.
99. The concept of “net neutrality” was the primary driver behind the FCC’s
Open Internet Order. See Open Internet, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). Net
neutrality rules prohibited BIAS providers from blocking access to certain types
of content, compromising internet traffic, and prioritizing internet in exchange
for fees. See id.
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exercised its newfound jurisdiction over ISPs.100 On April 1,
2016, the Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on the privacy of customers of broadband and
communications services.101 The NPRM garnered over 275,000
submissions from providers, consumers, and other interested
parties—including the FTC.102
The Commission adopted the proposed rules following the
notice-and-comment period.103 The regulations focused on
providing consumers “transparency, choice, and data security”
combined with “heightened protection for sensitive customer
information.”104 The Commission established mechanisms to
protect personally identifiable information—defined as “any
information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an
individual or device.”105 First, the Commission mandated “optin” consent to use and share location services, financial
information, social security numbers, web browsing history, and
other similar data.106 Second, the Commission prohibited “takeit-or-leave-it” offers—situations where ISPs refused to provide
services to non-consenting consumers.107 Third, the rules
mandated disclosure of data breaches.108 Notably, the

100. See, e.g., Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 2501.
101. See generally id.
102. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband & Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Docket No. 16-106, Report and Order ¶ 4
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1
.pdf [hereinafter Report and Order]. See generally Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband & Other Telecommunications Services, WC Docket
No. 16-106, Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection
of the Federal Trade Commission (May 27, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff-bureau-consumerprotection-federal-trade-commission-federal-communications-commission
/160527fcccomment.pdf [hereinafter Comment of the Staff].
103. Report and Order, supra note 102, ¶¶ 399–404.
104. Id. ¶ 5.
105. Id. ¶ 89.
106. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, FACT SHEET: THE FCC ADOPTS ORDER TO GIVE
BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL
INFORMATION 2 (Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. The Commission does
“infer consent” for certain purposes such as use and sharing of non-sensitive
information to provide and market services and equipment typically marketed
with the broadband service subscribed to by the customer. Id.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id.
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Commission explicitly stated that regulation over edge providers
remained within the province of the FTC.109
E. DATA PRIVACY LITIGATION: PRELIMINARY PRECEDENT AND
THE COURT’S OPINION IN SPOKEO
Data privacy lawsuits present three types of plaintiffs:
victims of data breaches who have suffered material harm,
victims of breaches who have yet to suffer harm, and those
seeking to force companies into compliance with lawful data
practices.110 Plaintiffs in the first category generally have access
to courts because they have suffered an injury like identity
theft.111 However, for the other classes of data privacy plaintiffs,
Article III’s “case-or-controversy” requirement presents a
significant barrier to court access.112 The Supreme Court
outlined the “case-or-controversy” requirement in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,113 requiring putative plaintiffs to allege
“an injury in fact,” i.e., a “concrete and particularized,” “actual
or imminent” “invasion of a legally protected interest.”114
Second, “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of” must exist.115 “Third, it must be ‘likely’ . . . that
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”116
1. Precedent Vacillates on Future Harm for Data Breaches
Plaintiffs’ access to court—based on the possibility of future
harm from data breaches—teetered between the Circuits. The
Seventh Circuit noted “the injury-in-fact requirement can be
satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the
plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s

109. Id. at 4.
110. See generally Caroline C. Cease, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at
the Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2014).
111. Id. at 397–98; see, e.g., Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437–38 (6th
Cir. 2014) (concluding plaintiff suffered an injury sufficient for Article III
standing when a third party made purchases on her account using information
on a ticket she received).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
113. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
114. Lujan, 540 U.S. at 560.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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actions.”117 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit determined that
allegations based on future harm failed to confer Article III
standing in the absence of a “certainly impending” injury.118
The Supreme Court appeared to restrict Article III standing
requirements in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.119
Though not a data breach case, the plaintiffs brought claims
based on the “objectively reasonable likelihood” that the
government would surveil their communications and the costs
the plaintiffs incurred to protect client confidentiality.120 The
Supreme Court rejected these claims as an attempt to
“manufacture standing.”121 Although the Court did not foreclose
threatened injury as a proper basis for Article III standing, it
articulated a fairly stringent temporal requirement, noting
“‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”122
Instead, threatened injury must be “certainly impending” to
constitute injury in fact.123
117. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d. Cir. 2006) (stating
future risk from exposure to toxic substances is a sufficient injury for Article III
purposes); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding a defective medical device’s increased risk of future health
problems a sufficient injury for Article III standing purposes); and Cent. Delta
Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2002)
(permitting plaintiffs suit to continue even when the plaintiff’s injury is a
factual issue)). In Pisciotta, the plaintiffs sued Old National Bank after a data
breach resulted in no identity theft, but forced the plaintiffs to incur costs for
credit monitoring. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631.
118. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (6th Cir. 2011). Reilly
presented facts similar to Pisciotta. Id. at 40. A hacker penetrated an
information system belonging to Ceridian, a payroll processing company. Id.
The plaintiffs brought claims based on increased threat of identity theft,
incurred costs to monitor credit, and emotional distress. Id. The Sixth Circuit
held that, unless the plaintiffs could show the hacker copied the information
and used it, they did not suffer any harm. Id. at 43.
119. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012).
120. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143. The plaintiffs in Clapper believed
government agencies monitored their communications with foreign individuals
under § 1881 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Id. FISA
authorized government agencies to engage in surveillance provided the
government received approval from FISA courts. Id. at 1154–55. Plaintiffs
believed they engaged in communications with “‘people located in geographic
areas that are a special focus’ of the Government’s counterterrorism or
diplomatic efforts.” Id. at 1145 (quoting plaintiff’s App. to Pet. for Cert.).
121. Id. at 1155.
122. Id. at 1147 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
123. Id. at 1155.
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged Clapper’s holding, but
permitted a data breach class action to continue in Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC.124 Neiman Marcus suffered a data
breach and disclosed it to customers who shopped in stores over
the course of a year.125 The evidence did not prove actual identity
theft.126 Given the uncontested evidence that hackers stole the
plaintiffs’ data, the Seventh Circuit declared, “it is plausible to
infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm
from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”127 For the Seventh
Circuit, this met the threshold for a certainly impending injury.
2. Spokeo: The Supreme Court Denies Court Access for
Consumers Seeking to Enforce Their Privacy Interests
The Supreme Court kept the status of consumer data
litigation in flux in Spokeo v. Robbins.128 Spokeo operated a
“people search engine” that gathered information about
individuals and disseminated reports about them on publicly
accessible websites.129 Spokeo generated an inaccurate profile on
the plaintiff in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s
requirement that consumer reporting agencies “‘follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of’
consumer reports.”130 The plaintiff charged, among other
matters, that the inaccurate report impaired his ability to secure
employment.131 The issue in Spokeo centered on whether the
statutory violation put forth in the complaint satisfied the “[f]irst
and foremost” requirement of Article III standing—whether the
injury was concrete and particularized.132 Although the Court
took no position on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate
conclusion, it held the Circuit Court did not properly delineate
between “concrete” and “particularized.”133 For standing

124. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir.
2015).
125. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
126. Id. at 692.
127. Id. at 693.
128. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
129. Id. at 1544.
130. Id. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012)).
131. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1547–48 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
133. Id. at 1550.
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purposes, “concrete” does not equate to tangible.134 Justice Alito,
quoting the opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan,
noted that Congress can elevate certain injuries “that were
previously inadequate in law” and “articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.”135 However, the Court held, “Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.”136 The Court did not detail how an intangible injury
may satisfy the concrete requirement, but opined “[a] violation
of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no
harm.”137 Based on this, the Supreme Court determined that an
inaccurate report by a credit agency, without more, was not a
sufficiently concrete injury and remanded to the Ninth Circuit
for further consideration.138
II. ANALYSIS
A dichotomy exists between the law and consumers’
reasonable expectations about their privacy. Consumers want
greater autonomy over their personally identifiable information
and are unsettled by companies like Spokeo—even if the
company produces a completely accurate report.139 The FCC’s
slight entry into data privacy rulemaking in conjunction with

134. Id. at 1549 (“Although tangible injuries tangible injuries are perhaps
easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”) (citing Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (recognizing intangible harm in
restricting free speech); and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (classifying city ordinances restricting the
free exercise of religion as an intangible injury sufficient for Article III
purposes)).
135. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)
and Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1550.
138. Id.
139. See SOLOVE, supra note 35, at 118–19 (discussing how, through the
process of data aggregation, technology produces “digital dossiers” on people).
But cf. Larry Downes, The Downside of the FCC’s New Internet Privacy Rules,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (May 27, 2016) https://hbr.org/2016/05/the-downside-ofthe-fccs-new-internet-privacy-rules (arguing that data aggregation supports
the services American consumers use every day, like Google, because of its
dependency on ad revenue).
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the FTC’s enforcement approach represents what some experts
consider a layered approach to internet regulation.140
A. THE FTC FALLS SHORT OF MEETING CONSUMER
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT PRIVACY BECAUSE OF RESOURCE
LIMITATIONS, ENFORCEMENT CONSTRAINTS, AND MARKET
REALITIES
The FTC’s measures to protect consumer data should be
lauded, but the Agency’s limited ability to protect consumers’
privacy interests must be recognized. The Agency faces a
Herculean task. Its jurisdiction over edge providers—whose
numbers are in the billions—is only a subset of the Agency’s
oversight over the majority of American industry.141 Seven
divisions of the Agency regulate consumer protection, but only
forty-six people staff the Agency’s Division of Privacy and
Identity Protection.142 As such, the Agency averages about only
ten complaints per year.143 This diverts the Agency’s regulatory
focus from wielding industry-wide change to targeting lowhanging fruit.144 Rather than forcing edge providers to evaluate
whether they are honoring their privacy policies, the FTC’s
limited resources incentivize companies to ensure their practices
are not so egregious as to warrant FTC scrutiny.145
The FTC’s interactions with Google exemplifies the perverse
incentives that exist under the Agency’s regulatory approach. In
2012, the FTC reached a settlement with Google for violating its

140. Claffy & Clark, supra note 19, at 463. Generally, layered regulation
posits different firms within the larger internet ecosystem can be subject to
different regulations based on their differing speed of innovation, technological
change and resources. See id. at 467, 480.
141. JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 47
(4th ed. 2013) (“[The FTC] has jurisdiction over all U.S. entities except banks,
savings and loan institutions, federal credit unions, common carriers and
nonprofits . . . .”).
142. Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 600–01.
143. Id. at 600 (“The FTC has lodged just over 170 privacy-related
complaints since 1997, averaging about ten complaints per year.”).
144. Thomas B. Norton, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and
the New Critique of Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 204 (2016) (arguing the FTC’s approach
results in the agency only going after the most egregious offenders of data
privacy practices).
145. See Grossman, supra note 69, at 1308 (“Thus, the FTC appears to expect
companies to perform a cost-benefit analysis when designing its security
program . . . .”).
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tracking policies.146 The FTC heralded the victory and declared,
“No matter how big or small, all companies must . . . keep their
privacy promises to consumers . . . .”147 Google begged to differ.
The company did not admit wrongdoing and paid a fine many
observers viewed as a drop in the bucket.148 Moreover, during
the same time period, Google announced a plan to consolidate
user information across most of Google’s services, which many
privacy advocates viewed as a flagrant violation of its privacy
policy.149 The FTC acquiesced to this, and even worked toward
dismissing complaints brought by consumer privacy groups to
force the Agency to act.150
The FTC aspires for a harmonious balance between the
divergent interests of consumers and edge providers. In reality,
the latter complain the Agency does not provide concrete
guidance to work with. “The FTC has been ‘particularly tightlipped about what data security standards it expects’ companies
to employ, and a ‘chorus of lawyers and scholars have
complained
that
enforcement
is
misguided
absent
clearer . . . standards.’”151 Companies do not know at which point
146. See Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It
Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-itmisrepresented (highlighting Google’s violation of an earlier privacy settlement
between the company and the FTC, agreeing to settle for $22.5 million).
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, Google Hit with Record $22.5 Million Fine for
Safari Tracking, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012
/aug/10/business/la-fi-google-ftc-20120810 (comparing the $22.5 million to
Google’s nearly $38 billion in profits the previous year).
149. Warwick Ashford, Google Privacy Re-Write Raises Data Protection
Concerns, COMPUTER WKLY. (Jan. 25, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://www.computer
weekly.com/news/2240114313/Google-privacy-re-write-raises-concerns
(“Google’s re-write of its privacy policies comes within months of reaching a
settlement with the [FTC] for misrepresenting how it used personal information
and for sharing a user’s data without approval.”).
150. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, No. 12-206-ABJ, 2012 WL 5884020 (D. D.C. Feb. 17, 2012); Complaint
for Injunctive Relief, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 1:12cv-00206, 2012 WL 413966 (D. D.C. Feb. 8, 2012).
151. Michael D. Simpson, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer Data
Breach Rights and Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. COLO.
L. REV. 670, 697 (2016) (quoting Patricia Bailin, Study: What FTC Enforcement
Actions Teach Us About the Features of Reasonable Privacy and Data Security
Practices, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFS.: WESTIN RES. CTR. (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://iapp.org/news/a/study-what-ftc-enforcement-actions-teach-us-about-
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their data practices will prompt an inquiry from the Agency. 152
While FTC enforcement actions may correct a particular
company’s practices, the ad hoc approach leaves little in the form
of precedent: FTC enforcement actions generally result in
settlements that permit companies to avoid any admission of
wrongdoing.153 Consequently, only three FTC actions provide
any judicial guidance on unfair or deceptive data privacy
practices.154
Perhaps recognizing its internal limitations, the FTC also
“encourag[es] companies and self-regulatory organizations to
adhere to high standards.”155 However, attempts at selfregulation have been plagued by “inadequate participation,
weak enforcement, and standards that [are] not sufficiently
protective.”156 Market incentives do not exist to meet the lofty
promises of self-regulation.157 Rather, companies seek to
monetize consumer data as Google has—known as “Google
envy.”158 Certainly, commoditization of data benefits consumers
in that many of the essential services consumers enjoy on the
internet would not be free without this phenomenon.159
the-features-of-reasonable-privacy-and-data-security-practices/)) (omission in
original).
152. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 69, at 1309 (noting how the FTC
refrains from mandating any technical changes and instead focuses on process
and administrative oversight).
153. See Solove & Herzog, supra note 7, at 610 (“One of the main motivations
for settling with the FTC is that it allows the company to avoid admitting
wrongdoing in exchange for remedial measures.”).
154. Id. at 610–11 (pointing to only one case resulting in a judicial opinion,
and only two others currently awaiting resolution in federal district court).
155. Comment of the Staff, supra note 102, at 30.
156. Hirsch, supra note 26, at 464.
157. See id. at 458–59 (noting several deficiencies in the self-regulation
approach).
158. Ohm, supra note 27, at 1426 (attributing “Google envy” to the
company’s ability to monetize their user’s behavior); see Christopher BatisteBoykin, In Re Google, Inc.: ECPA, Consent, and the Ordinary Course of Business
in an Automated World, 20 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 21, 21 (2015) (“Either way,
users of [edge] providers, like Google, should be wary because online
communications are becoming a rich resource for companies to mine for data.
As advances in technology occur . . . online communications will inform
advertisers of users’ tastes, preferences, beliefs, associations, interests,
schedules, locations, ages, and incomes.”).
159. See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for
Our Data, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 777, 784 (2016) (“Services like Gmail, Google
Calendar, and Facebook are only free because users’ data empowers Google and
Facebook to generate a lot of revenue from selling ads.”).
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However, there is a difference between Google’s use of personally
identifiable information to generate revenue from online
advertising and OkCupid soliciting information about drug use
and sexual history and selling it to purveyors of personal
information.160 Self-regulation does not adequately curb the
troubling conduct of the latter.
B. SPOKEO’S OPINION LIMITS CONSUMERS’ ABILITY TO LITIGATE
THEIR OWN PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER CONSUMER PROTECTION
STATUTES
As stated above, several FTC statutes permit private rights
of action. However, absent a worst-case scenario data breach, the
federal private rights of action provide little redress to
consumers.
Spokeo exacerbated this problem. Like most consumers, the
plaintiff wanted readily accessible online information about him
to be accurate and Spokeo failed to live up to its statutory
obligations to ensure a modicum of accuracy.161 However, using
somewhat contradictory logic, the Supreme Court determined
that this alone did not entitle the Plaintiff to court access.162 The
Court professed deference to Congressional judgment when
faced with a statutory private right of action, noting “Congress
is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet
minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also
instructive and important.”163 Despite this acknowledgment, the
Court held the false report amounted to only a bare procedural

160. Id. at 801 (discussing how OkCupid, an internet dating site, solicits
users about their sexual history and drug use and sells the information off to
third parties); see Joseph Jerome, Big Data: Catalyst for a Privacy Conversation,
48 IND. L. REV. 213, 233 (2014) (noting there is little consensus in offering
consumers control with regards to third party advertising industries).
161. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016). Spokeo had been
in hot water for the exact same issue before. The FTC extracted an $800,000
settlement from the company for, among other things, failing to ensure its
profiles contained accurate information, a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. See Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (June 12, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedlymarketed.
162. See generally id.
163. Id.
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harm.164 Justice Alito analogized the incorrect report to an
improperly reported zip code, noting “it is difficult to imagine
how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more,
could work any concrete harm.”165
Putting aside the questionable accuracy of Justice Alito’s
analogy, Spokeo’s effect on the Circuit Courts has not been
favorable to consumers. In Gubala v. Time Warner Cable,166 the
Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s case for lack of standing.167 The plaintiff alleged that
Time Warner Cable violated the Cable Act when it failed to
dispose of his data following his termination of the services.168
The Seventh Circuit “tentatively [assumed] that Time Warner
violated the statute by failing to destroy the personally
identifiable information.”169 Nevertheless, in light of Spokeo’s
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit held that failure to destroy
personally identifiable information amounted to a procedural
harm.170 The Eighth Circuit held as much in Braitberg v. Charter
Communications, Inc.171 Like Gubala, Charter Communications
failed to destroy personally identifiable information after the
plaintiff terminated his services.172 The plaintiff failed to satisfy
Article III standing because he did not allege, “Charter has
disclosed the information to a third party; that any outside party
has accessed the data, or that Charter has used the information
in any way during the disputed period.”173
Spokeo involved an FTC statute while Braitberg and Gubala
dealt with FCC private rights of action. However, the effect is
clear. The judiciary’s commitment to Article III standing and
concerns about judicial economy adversely impacts its

164. Id. at 1549 (stating that, had Robins alleged only a “bare procedural
violation,” it would not satisfy Article III’s requirement for injury-in-fact).
165. Id. at 1550.
166. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017).
167. Id. at 911.
168. Id. at 910.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 911 (dismissing plaintiff’s arguments that the violations are
substantive).
171. See generally Braitberg v. Charter Commc’n, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th
Cir. 2016).
172. Id. at 926.
173. Id. at 930.
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receptiveness towards individual suits seeking to enforce
privacy interests.174
C. THE FCC SHOULD REGULATE ISPS BECAUSE OF ITS BROAD
REGULATORY APPROACH AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IN
OVERSEEING COMMUNICATIONS
As the specter of regulation tends to do, the FCC’s
regulatory shifts sent shudders through some interested
parties.175 As to the Commission’s data privacy rulemaking,
commentators lamented that the “rules would impose additional
costs on both consumers (in terms of time) and broadband
providers (in terms of time and resources) for no obvious
beneficial purpose.”176 Others said that it would foment
regulatory confusion on the matter.177 However, for reasons
stated below combined with pervasive incentives to monetize
consumer data, a strong regulatory regime specific to ISPs is
necessary.178

174. See generally Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir.
2017); Consumer Protection, 29 BUS. TORTS REP. 89 (2017) (“[Spokeo v. Robins]
wreak[s] havoc on consumers’ efforts to seek statutory damages for violations of
consumer financial and privacy protection laws.”).
175. See Marsha Blackburn, Why We Need a Free Market Approach for the
Communications and High-Tech Sectors, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, supra note 88, at 12 (classifying
net neutrality reclassification as “freedom destroying”); see also Downes, supra
note 139 (arguing that data aggregation supports the services American
consumers use every day, like Google, because of its dependency on ad revenue).
176. Rosemary C. Harold, The FCC Forgot Something in Piecing Together
Its Complex Proposal for Broadband Privacy Regulation: Consumers, 17
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 62, 63 (2016).
177. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband & Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Docket No. 16-106, Comments of CTIA 1–2
(May 26, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002064853.pdf; see also Maureen
K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Public Policy Briefing on Privacy
Regulation after Net Neutrality at the George Mason University School of Law:
The FTC, The FCC, and BIAS (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/public_statements/942823/160331gmuspeech1.pdf
(arguing
against different sets of regulation for similarly situated companies in the
internet ecosystem and that ISPs are similarly situated to edge providers).
178. Data brokers are the prime example of the monetary incentive that
exists for data. Data brokers purchase personal information from different
sources to compile digital dossiers. See Hirsch, supra note 26, at 449–50.
Because data brokers seek to connect the digital with the physical person, ISPs
are especially attractive because they have access to both kinds of information.
See id. (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
4, 13 (2000)).
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For its part, the FTC issued a measured response to the
FCC’s rulemaking that belied what some observers deem a “turf
war” between the two agencies.179 The Agency characterized the
prospect of two regulatory regimes as “not optimal.”180 Although
the FTC commended the FCC for considering privacy interests,
the Agency affirmed its ability enforce consumer privacy
interests under its Section 5 enforcement powers, stating that
the notice-and-choice model “maximizes consumer selfdetermination.”181
Instead of speculating about the prospect of a dual
regulatory regime over ISPs, the FTC should relent to the FCC.
Although the FCC’s rules may have a negligible effect on the
broader internet ecosystem, they provide rigorous guidelines
that vindicate consumer privacy interests in ways the FTC and
the judiciary cannot.
The FCC’s rulemaking stemmed from the premise that ISPs
sit in a heightened position in the internet ecosystem as the
“gatekeeper.”182 The FCC’s basic contention is correct for four
reasons. First, ISPs provide the bridge between the edge
provider and the consumer; they maintain, control, and transmit
the data between the two.183 Second, ISPs “enjoy a confluence of
both a total view into subscribers’ Internet access habits on one
hand, and knowledge of physical information about subscribers
such as home address and financial information on the other.”184
179. See, e.g., Kate Cox, Final FCC Privacy Rule Won’t Ban Pay-For Privacy,
Will Require Some Opt-Ins, CONSUMERIST (Oct. 6, 2016, 2:01 PM), https://
consumerist.com/2016/10/06/final-fcc-isp-privacy-rule-doesnt-ban-pay-forprivacy-does-require-some-opt-ins/ (discussing ISP industry lamentations over
a “turf war” between the FTC and FCC); Amir Nasr, Roles of FTC, FCC Are
Front and Center in Privacy Debate, MORNING CONSULT (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://morningconsult.com/2016/09/27/roles-ftc-fcc-front-center-privacydebate/ (“‘It’s a turf war. Let’s be honest. It’s a turf war,’ said Tim Sparapani,
senior policy counsel at CALinnovates, a technology advocacy coalition.”); see
also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Why Is the FCC Insensitive to Data Sensitivity?,
THE HILL (Sept. 22, 2016, 10:10 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog
/technology/297194-why-is-the-fcc-insensitive-to-data-sensitivity.
180. See Comment of the Staff, supra note 102, at 8.
181. See Ohlhausen, supra note 177, at 3.
182. See Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 2501–03. But see
Ohlhausen, supra note 177, at 4–7. The FTC questions to what extent ISPs
enjoy special status in the internet ecosystem.
183. See Ohm, supra note 27, at 1423 (“[The ISP’s] principal role is routing—
it receives communications from its users and sends them out to the rest of the
world, and vice versa . . . .”).
184. FELD ET AL., supra note 27.
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Third, the market between ISPs and edge providers are polar
opposites—the former is concentrated while the latter grows
exponentially.185 Fourth, demand for ISPs is inelastic.
Consumers must provide their personally identifiable
information to ISPs if they want to enjoy the functionality of the
internet.186
As stated above, the FTC’s limited resources and selective
enforcement hamper its ability to spur industry-wide change.
Were the FTC to continue leading the way on ISP data privacy,
it would perpetuate the “whack-a-mole” problem.187 The FTC’s
battles with Google exemplify the issue; where the Agency
succeeds in stopping one privacy practice, another one
emerges.188 The FCC’s rulemaking authority offers a solution
and provides a dual benefit for data privacy standards in
general. First, rulemaking eschews targeted enforcement in
favor of baseline standards for acceptable conduct for ISPs.189
Although regulations in the form of rulemakings are contentious
and often the subject of derision amongst policy makers, the
alternative thrusts ISPs into the jurisdiction of the FTC—and
the anomalous results it produces.190 Rulemakings, by contrast,
immediately establish a duty of care on the ISP without
compromising the entity’s ability to collect information needed
to provide the service.191

185. Compare Seth L. Cooper, Restoring Minimal Regulatory Environment
for a Healthy Wireless Future, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, supra note 88, at 83, with Total Number
of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/totalnumber-of-websites/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
186. See FELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 46 (“[C]onsumers generally cannot
opt out of a BIAS provider’s data collection without opting out of the Internet
entirely.”).
187. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 987.
188. See id. at 999–1000.
189. Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the Choice
Between Ex-Post Liability and Ex-Ante Regulation, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 29,
31 (2004) (“The advantage of ex-ante regulation . . . is that it leverages
enforcement resources to greater effect by always sanctioning negligent
conduct . . . .”).
190. See Blackburn, supra note 175 (deriding the FCC’s Open Internet
Order); see also Ohlhausen supra note 177 (criticizing the general outline of the
FCC’s privacy rules); Simpson, supra note 151 (identifying complaints about the
FTC’s privacy regulation).
191. See FELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 62.
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The FCC’s rulemaking provides the additional benefit of
placing autonomy in the hands of consumers while closing the
knowledge gap between the consumer and ISP. Observers
speculate that consumers participate in an unequal playing field
in terms of knowing to what extent ISPs and edge providers use
their personally identifiable information.192 Perhaps exploiting
this advantage, ISPs and edge providers dictate opaque privacy
policies that facilitate maximum control over consumer
information.193 The FCC’s rulemaking shifts a modicum of
control back to the consumer. For example, the default to opt-in
of sharing information reflects consumer sentiments about
seeking greater control of their data.194 Second, the rulemaking
empowers consumers to understand these polices to a greater
degree because it mandates that ISPs provide information about
how they collect and use data.195
With that said, the degree to which data engineers the
internet consumers enjoy today cannot be denied. Data collection
and monitoring increase cybersecurity and facilitate basic online
services.196 The FCC’s policy objectives strike the delicate
balance between honoring legitimate data practices while
meeting reasonable privacy expectations.197 The TCPA
demonstrates how the FCC accomplishes this feat. At its peak,
retail from telemarketing totaled sales of $435 billion.198
However, telemarketing also spawned abusive practices like

192. Yong Jin Park, Digital Literacy and Privacy Behavior Online, 40
COMM’N RES. 215, 232 (2013) (“[U]sers are stratified and far from competent in
exercising privacy control, different from such policy premise.
Furthermore, . . . the levels of understanding of surveillance practices common
in websites remain miniscule among the majority of users.”).
193. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Transparency and Broadband Internet Service
Providers, 4 INT’L J. COMMC’N 738, 745 (2010) (discussing the incentive for ISPs
to hide privacy policies because of the ability of data to generate revenue).
194. See FACT SHEET, supra note 106, at 3.
195. Id.
196. See Ohm, supra note 27, at 1466–67 (identifying four helpful functions
ISPs derive from data monitoring: (1) monitoring broadband traffic, (2)
detecting spam, (3) detecting viruses, (4) securing and policing bandwidth); see
also Downes, supra note 139.
197. See, e.g., FELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 35 (“[T]he FCC has a twin
mandate to protect consumers and to promote . . . competition.”).
198. Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tugof-War: Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment
with Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1055 (1992).
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telemarketing scams.199 The FCC, in conjunction with the FTC,
tailored restrictions on the time and form of telemarketing
calls.200 Twenty years later, privacy advocates declare the TCPA
to be an “enormous success.”201
Finally, from a broad policy perspective, it makes sense to
demarcate regulatory jurisdiction between ISPs and edge
providers, with the former subject to FCC rulemakings and the
latter subject to the FTC. The FCC traditionally regulates “core
communications”—be they telephone, cable, or radio
communications.202 These traditionally separate industries and
services are collapsing and converging.203 Recognizing the
industry reality, it makes little sense to continue fragmented
classification of broadband providers when they provide the
same telecommunications services on an increasingly large
scale.
III. CONCLUSION
The problems posed by voluminous compendiums of
personally identifiable information show no signs of abating.
What is increasing is consumer awareness about these issues.
The breadth of the internet ecosystem poses significant
199. See id. at 1056.
200. See Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance
/complying-telemarketing-sales-rule (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
201. Letter from Mark Rotenberg, President, EPIC, Claire Garland,
Director, EPIC Consumer Privacy Project, & James Graves, Fellow, EPIC Law
& Tech., to The Honorable Greg Walden, Chairman, U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce, & The Honorable Anna Eshoo,
Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy &
Commerce (Sept. 21, 2016), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20160922
/105351/HHRG-114-IF16-20160922-SD004.pdf.
202. See Speta, supra note 88, at 71.
203.
[E]mploying new digital broadband networks, traditional ‘telephone’
companies began offering multichannel video services, and ‘cable
television’ operators began offering voice services. Both telephone
companies and cable operators, along with ‘cell phone’ providers,
offered data services over increasingly higher-speed broadband
networks . . . . Of course, the old labels commonly used to denominate
the various service providers, such as ‘telephone’ or ‘cable television’
or ‘cell phone’ companies, became increasingly obsolete as the
marketplace continued to evolve.
Randolph J. May, Introduction: Overhauling Communications Law and Policy
in the Digital Age, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, supra note 88, at 5.
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regulatory challenges that the FTC is ill-equipped to deal with,
despite the Agency’s best efforts. Therefore, consumers should
welcome the FCC lending its own expertise to the matter.
Although the scope of the Commission’s rulemaking can only go
so far, it establishes baseline default rules for actors in the
internet ecosystem who have unique access to consumer data.
This also frees up resources for the FTC to regulate edge
providers. In addition, the regulatory environment for ISPs and
edge providers must be robust, as consumers have limited
recourse to litigate their own privacy interests in court.

***

